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Abstract 
 
Unlike other scriptures, the Qur‟an engages man as he is, that is, man 
as a composite of opposing tendencies. It guides the believer as much 
as it strives to save the disbelieving skeptic. In speaking to the skep-
tic, the Qur‟an uses all the resources of rhetoric that have a chance of 
softening his disbelief and bring him back to his spiritual home. This 
essay examines two sets of pragmatic arguments in the Qur‟an for be-
lief, both based on a system of divine accountability: in one the ac-
counting occurs in afterlife, in the other it occurs in this life. In pre-
senting the first argument, the Qur‟an anticipates Pascal‟s wager. This 
argument is later taken up by „Ali, Islam‟s fourth orthodox caliph, 
and Al-Ghazzali. Further, it is shown that religions generally, and Is-
lam in particular, establish the contain the premises for enunciating 
Pascal‟s wager. 
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Say: ‘Have you ever thought: what if this revelation  
really is from God and you still reject it? 
 
Qur’an (Fussilat/41, 52)1 
 
More than any other scripture, the Qur‟an engages the skeptic who 
mocks and challenges its metaphysical claims. Unafraid, the Islam-
ic scripture admits this disbeliever into its discourse, allowing him 
to argue against the prophets, accuse them of sorcery, and dare 
them to do their best to dislodge him from his disbelief. Occasio-
nally, the Qur‟an even allows the prophets to voice their discom-
fort with metaphysical claims, for they too are human and seek 
confirmation of these claims in sensory experience.   
The Qur‟an speaks to man in a variety of rhetorical modes, seeking 
to bring him back to the straight path, to raise him from the lowest of the low 
to the finest state in which he was originally created.2 It draws man to 
God by pointing to His myriad creations, from something as small as a 
gnat to the heavens raised without any visible support. It asks man to look 
around, he will not see any flaw in God's creation; to observe how the 
Lord holds up the birds spreading and closing their wings; to see the ships, 
sailing like floating mountains; to ponder on how livestock produces pure 
milk, sweet to the drinker from ; etc. Thus, by reflecting upon the order 
and beauty of the heavens and earth, the Qur‟an expects that men and 
women will begin to discern in them the signs of their Creator.  
In order to awaken man to a recognition of his higher calling, 
God uses a variety of logical and rhetorical devices. It appeals to his 
powers of observation, reasoning, imagination, moral sense and aes-
thetic faculties, as well as his anxieties, fears and hopes. God gave 
leave to some of his prophets to dazzle their audience with miracles: 
to Muhammad he gave the miracle of the Qur‟an which unremitting-
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ly engages in reasoned discourse with men and women of diverse ca-
pacities and tendencies. The Qur‟an appeals to man‟s intellect. 
If the Qur‟an engages endlessly in reasoned discourse, it also 
knows that this epistemic approach to belief will not work for eve-
ryone.3 Indeed, most people will not believe, however eagerly you may want 
them to. For men and women whose intellect cannot be awakened 
to an awareness of metaphysical realities, the Qur‟an employs 
pragmatic arguments that appeal to their regard for their own 
happiness. It will be the task of this essay to examine these argu-
ments. In particular, we will show that the pragmatic argument(s) 
associated with Blaise Pascal – the brilliant French mathematician, 
mystic and theologian of the 17th century – were anticipated by the 
Qur‟an in the seventh century, and then taken up by Ali, Mu-
hammad‟s first cousin and the fourth of the orthodox caliphs, and 
Al-Ghazzali, the great Islamic theologian of the 11-12th centuries. 
 
♦ 
 
Pragmatic arguments for belief may appeal to individual prudence 
based on the chance of an afterlife; or they may invoke real or im-
agined benefits that belief may confer on individuals or societies in 
this life. Both arguments are found in the Qur‟an, but this essay will 
focus on arguments of the first type. In particular, we examine the 
wager that the Qur‟an implicitly proposes to the skeptics, one that 
is similar in its essentials to a common version of Pascal‟s wager. 
Implicitly, the Qur‟anic wager satisfies all the conditions set out by 
William James for such a wager to have force. 
The most common version of Pascal‟s wager is quickly summa-
rized. “Either God is or he is not.” Since reason is of no help in 
choosing between the two – and you must choose – reason itself 
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demands that you consult your “happiness” and choose the op-
tion that holds the prospect of bringing greater happiness. You 
compare the gains and losses that will flow from the two choices – 
either God is or he is not – and choose the belief from which you 
expect to receive the greater gain. Let us suppose that you have 
placed a wager on God. In this case, “if you win you win every-
thing, if you lose you lose nothing.” “Do not hesitate then,” Pas-
cal concludes, and “wager that he does exist.”4 Wager on God be-
cause the outcomes for believing are either superior to or no 
worse than those for disbelief.5 This argument is pragmatic be-
cause it makes utility – in the absence of evidence – the criterion 
for forming beliefs.  
The Qur‟an makes a similar argument in the epigraph to this 
essay as well as in other ayaat  (plural of ayat, verse or sign) that we 
shall examine in the next section.6 First, consider the context of 
the what if argument in this ayat. It appears nearly at the end of su-
rah Fussilat, a chapter that deeply engages those who doubt that they 
will meet their lord. (54) The chapter begins with a dare to the 
blessed Prophet from the pagans of Mecca. They say, ‘Our hearts are 
encased against what you call us to; our ears are heavy; there is a barrier be-
tween us and you. So you do whatever you want, and so shall we.’ This su-
rah and indeed the entire Qur‟an may be read as offering answers 
to this challenge using a variety of arguments. Surah Fussilat draws 
attention to the origins of the cosmos: how God created the hea-
vens and earth from smoke. It reminds the pagans of the blast that 
destroyed „Ad and Thamud – two ancient peoples of Arabia – 
warns them of the Day, when God's enemies are gathered up for the Fire 
and driven forward, a Day on which they will not be allowed to make 
amends; it draws attention to His signs, and tells the pagans that if 
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God can revive the dead earth, he can certainly give life to the dead. It 
is at this point – that is, after sustained attempts to weaken the pa-
gan‟s rejection of the Qur‟an – that God asks Muhammad (s) to 
make the pragmatic argument. 
It is clear from Fussilat – as it is from other suwar (plural of su-
rah) in the Qur‟an – that the pagans directed their skepticism most 
frequently against the notion of an afterlife.7 „There is only the life of 
this world:‟ the pagans declare categorically in surah al-Mu’minun, „we 
die, we live, but we will never be resurrected.‟8 It would appear that the 
pagans have made their choice: they have chosen this life over the 
one beyond the grave. In particular, they find it implausible that 
the dead will be resurrected on the Day of Judgment.  
The Qur‟an meets the pagans‟ skepticism on their own ground, 
with a rational appeal to their self-interest. It begins by asking, 
Have you ever thought: what if this Qur’an really is from God and you still 
reject it?9 Implicit in this question is the same wager that is set up 
by Pascal. „Either the Qur‟an is from God, or it is not. If the 
Qur‟an is from God, there is afterlife, there is an eternity in Hell 
for disbelievers, etc. The converse holds if the Qur‟an is not from 
God. These are your only options: and you have to choose one or 
the other. You have chosen to reject the Qur‟an, together with its 
belief in an afterlife. You are cocky about your choice: you think 
that afterlife is a lie and, therefore, you have nothing to fear from 
death.10 Your smugness is insupportable: can you be sure that you 
have not erred in rejecting the Qur‟an? What if you are wrong, 
what if this Qur’an really is from God? If it is from God and you still re-
ject it, you will suffer eternally in the fires of Hell. Rationally consi-
dered, then, you would want to avoid this risk at all costs. Avoid-
ance is simple: believe in the Qur‟an. Believe in this revelation – 
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God is saying – because this guarantees avoidance of eternal pu-
nishment.11 
Without any reference to Pascal‟s wager, the influential Pakis-
tani scholar, Sayyid Abul A‟ala Maududi, offers a similar tafseer (in-
terpretation) of the what-if ayat from Fussilat.12 It is not the course 
of wisdom – Maududi points out – to reject the Qur‟an. This re-
jection is not based on certain knowledge, but is a matter of 
speculation; hence, those who reject the Qur‟an could be wrong. 
If the disbeliever‟s position is the correct one, death will usher him 
and the believer into the same oblivion. One will not be better off 
than the other. On the other hand, if the Qur‟an is from God and 
all that the Qur‟an promises comes true, the disbeliever‟s plight 
will be a very sorry one. Now, therefore, the self-interest of the 
disbeliever indicates that he should give up his opposition to the 
Qur‟an. Nevertheless, Maududi shrinks from regarding this as an 
argument for embracing belief. Instead, he maintains that the 
Qur‟an urges the pagans not to use a merely speculative position 
to oppose others from turning to the Qur‟an. 
The Qur‟an‟s what-if question would carry no force if the pa-
gan‟s rejection of its divine origin was categorical; but that is not 
always the case.13 In Fussilat, God speaks thus of the arrogance of 
disbelieving man: Whenever We let him taste some of Our mercy after he 
has been afflicted, he is sure to say, ‘This is all my doing: I do not think the 
Hour will ever come, but even if I were to be taken back to my Lord, the best 
reward would await me with Him.’14  Similarly, in surah Ibrahim, the 
disbelievers among the people of Noah, „Ad and Thamud tell the 
prophets who were sent to them, „We do not believe the message you 
were sent with. We have disturbing doubts about what you are asking us to 
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do.‟ For pagans who reject afterlife categorically, the Qur‟anic wag-
er would fall on deaf ears. 
 
♦ 
 
Often the Qur‟an will return again and again to a subject it con-
siders important. So it is with the pragmatic arguments for belief 
that appeal to our prudence.15 Two variants of these arguments 
occur in the Qur‟an: they take the form of wagers that depend on 
accountability in afterlife and here on earth. 
The Qur‟an presents the pragmatic arguments in several voices. 
In a few cases, God makes the pragmatic argument, speaking in 
his own voice. More frequently, Muhammad is asked to use these 
arguments in his exchanges with the Arab pagans; on other occa-
sions, Noah, Abraham, Shu‟ayb and Hud employ these argument 
in debates with their own people. In surah Ghafir, a secret believer 
from the Pharaoh‟s family uses the pragmatic argument when 
pleading for the life of Moses.16  
If the Qur‟an repeatedly uses pragmatic arguments to make the 
case for belief, that is not only because the Prophet (s) was sent to 
mostly unbelieving Arabs, among the last people in the Middle East 
who had not been converted to a revealed religion. Nearly all the 
prophets mentioned in the Qur‟an encounter disbelievers who use 
reasoning and ordinary experience to reject divine revelation, afterlife 
and bodily resurrection. “A reasoning mind,” writes Bahauddin – fa-
ther of Jelaluddin Rumi – “cannot approach revelation.”17 Skepticism 
raises its head whenever excessive use of the rational faculty atro-
phies other modes of knowing. The Qur‟an speaks to the skeptic be-
cause he is present in all ages and societies. 
The Afterlife, the Day of Judgment, Heaven and Hell are 
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overwhelming facts in the Qur‟anic discourse about God's rela-
tionship to man. In consequence, the Qur‟an frames one variant 
of the pragmatic argument – in which man must choose between 
belief and unbelief – in terms of this eschatology.18 Once we ex-
amine the context of the what-if question in the epigraph to this 
essay, it becomes clear that it draws attention to the consequences 
of rejecting faith that will unfold in the life beyond the grave.  
As if to emphasize the importance of the what-if question in 
the epigraph, the Qur‟an repeats it with a minor change in surah 
Al-Ahqaf.19 Replacing this Qur’an with this [revelation], here God 
asks the same question, ‘Have you thought, what if this Qur’an really is 
from God and you reject it? In surah Luqman, the Qur‟an presents a 
more transparent formulation of this argument. When they are told, 
‘Follow what God has sent down,’ they say: ‘We shall follow what we saw our 
forefathers following. What! Even if Satan is calling them to the suffering of 
the Blazing Flame? Here, the Qur‟an spells out the consequence of 
rejecting faith; the rejecters will burn in Hell.  
In two other formulations of the what-if argument, the Qur‟an 
backs up the what-if argument by drawing attention to its authori-
ty, the source upon which it flows.20 In surah Hud, when the Mi-
dianties call into question Shu‟ayb‟s invitation to belief and charity, 
he answers „My people, can you not see? What if I am acting on clear evi-
dence from my Lord? This may be expanded as follows: „My people, 
you have chosen to reject my call to believe in God. What if I am 
acting on clear evidence from my Lord? That is to say, what if I am right 
and you are wrong? In that event, your error will be very costly.‟  
Earlier, in the same surah, Noah confronts his people with a simi-
lar question, ‘My people, think: if I did have a clear sign from my Lord, 
and He had given me grace of His own, though it was hidden from you…‟ In 
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these ayaat, both prophets are invoking the higher experiential ba-
sis of their invitation to belief. Hud is acting on clear evidence from 
God; likewise Noah has solid proof from God even though the un-
believers cannot see it. The prophets speak from a position of 
knowledge; they know for a certainty that there is an afterlife. 
Their task – in the Qur‟an – is to convince their interlocutors to 
make the correct wager. 
In one formulation of the pragmatic argument, The Qur‟an 
pointedly invites the disbeliever to compare the gains and losses 
from belief.21 After speaking of the humiliating punishment that 
awaits people who are arrogant, boastful, miserly, and do not believe in 
Him and the Last Day, the Qur‟an directly asks them to ponder over 
the consequences of believing: What harm would it do them to believe 
in God and the Last Day, and give charitably from the sustenance God has 
given them? This is an invitation to the disbeliever not only to weigh 
the gains and losses from belief but to compare them against the 
gains and losses that might flow from unbelief. The Qur‟an ex-
pects that this weighing of belief and unbelief will show that the 
balance of advantages favor the believer. If the unbeliever switch-
ed from unbelief to belief this change could not harm him: on the 
contrary it would bring clear and inestimable gains.  
In the Qur‟an, God also renders judgment on the living: he re-
wards some believers and punishes some unbelievers on earth.22 
Divine retribution for disbelieving nations is a recurring theme in 
the Qur‟an. Nearly always, when the Qur‟an speaks of previous 
prophets, it recalls how their people disobeyed their warnings and 
were destroyed for their disbelief. It speaks repeatedly of the pu-
nishments the Jews invited upon themselves for disobeying their 
prophets. The people of Noah disbelieved long before these [Meccan] disbe-
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lievers, as did the people of Rass, Thamud,/’Ad, Pharaoh, Lot,/the Forest-
Dwellers, Tubba’: all of these people disbelieved their messengers, and so My 
warning was realized.  Although they are not as frequent as warnings 
of punishments in afterlife, the Qur‟an makes it clear that God in-
tervenes in history not only to give guidance, he also rewards and 
punishes individuals and nations in historical time.  
Compared to the pragmatic arguments framed in terms of af-
terlife, many more invoke punishment in this life. Since the 
Qur‟an was seeking to persuade a disbelieving people, skeptical of 
belief in afterlife, warnings of imminent and sudden losses were 
likely to produce a stronger effect than distant and uncertain pu-
nishments in an afterlife. In several passages, the Qur‟an seeks to 
overthrow the disbeliever‟s hubris, their boasting that they are 
masters of their fate. Here are a few examples of the wager framed 
in terms of consequences of unbelief in this life. 
 
Do the people of these towns feel secure that Our punishment will not come upon 
them by night, while they are asleep?/Do the people of these towns feel secure that 
Our punishment will not come upon them by day, while they are at play?/Do 
they feel secure against God's plan? Only the losers feel secure against God's 
plan.23  
 
Can you be sure that God will not have you swallowed up into the earth when 
you are back on land, or that He will not send a sandstorm against you? Then 
you will find no one to protect you./Or can you be sure that he will not send you 
back out to sea, and send a violent storm against you to drown for being ungrate-
ful? 
 
‘Think: If God were to take away your hearing and your sight and seal up your 
hearts, what God other than He could restore them?’ Say,’ Think: if the punish-
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ment of God should come to you, suddenly or foreseeably, would anyone but evil-
doers be destroyed?‟ 
 
Are you sure that He who is in the Heaven will not make the earth swallow you 
up with a violent shudder/Are you sure that He who is in the Heaven will not 
send a whirlwind to pelt you with stones?/Those who went before them also disbe-
lieved – how terrible was My condemnation! 
 
Say, ‘Think: if His punishment were to come to you, during the night or day, 
what part of it would the guilty wish to hasten?/Will you believe it when it ac-
tually happens? 
 
In these ayaat, the Qur‟an is seeking to shake the Arab pagans out 
of their hubris: it forces them to engage in some soul-searching, to 
ask if their beliefs are founded on certainty, if they should risk their 
happiness upon a lie. Thus the questions: Do they feel secure…; Can 
you be sure…; and Are you sure… If they cannot rule out divine re-
tribution for their unbelief, their worship of idols, their arrogance, 
and their violation of the rights of others, should they not guard 
themselves against these terrible punishments , change course, and 
choose belief in God and afterlife? The Arab pagans may place a 
wager on God or against God, but in this case, the consequences 
could overtake them anytime, without notice. 
 
♦ 
 
The Qur‟an‟s pragmatic plea for belief was taken up by the great 
theologian of Islam, Al-Ghazzali of the 11th-12th centuries devel-
ops an argument similar to Pascal‟s wager in The Alchemy of Happi-
ness.24 In addition, he attributes this argument to „Ali ibn Abi Talib, 
cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. However, Ghazzali does 
not trace his discussion of the wager back to the Qur‟an.  
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In a quote attributed to him – by Ghazali – „Ali offers a very 
clear formulation of one version of Pascal‟s wager when making 
the case for belief with an unbeliever. “If you are right,” he tells 
the unbeliever, “then neither of us will be any the worse, but if we 
are right, then we shall escape, and you will suffer.”25 It is clear 
from „Ali‟s formulation that there are only two positions in mat-
ters of faith – you either believe or you don‟t. Moreover, belief 
and unbelief have consequences after death: for the believer, belief 
leads to an afterlife in heaven and unbelief is punished by an eter-
nity in hell. „Ali makes his case with consummate brevity, by com-
paring the consequences in afterlife for unbelief and belief. If the 
unbeliever is right, neither he nor the believer incurs any loss after 
death; on the other hand, if the believer is right, he goes to heaven 
and the unbeliever goes to hell. Alternatively, he is saying, „If the 
believer is wrong he loses nothing; but if the unbeliever is wrong, 
he is a big loser.‟ The inference is clear: accept belief and avoid 
Hell. Nearly a thousand years later, Pascal uses similar language. 
Like Ali, he too weighs up “the gain and loss involved in calling 
heads that God exists.” Pascal uses the language of the bet: Ali 
does not. It is appropriate that Ali should have grasped with clari-
ty the pragmatic argument for faith, since he is reputed to have 
possessed the most acute and philosophical mind among the 
companions of the Prophet. 
Al-Ghazzali elaborates upon Ali in this matter. Anticipating 
William James, he maintains that two conditions must be met if 
the wager is to have any force with an unbeliever.26 The unbeliever 
takes the position that “a future life is possible but that the doc-
trine is so involved in doubt and mystery that it is impossible to 
decide whether it be true or not…” In other words, the truth of 
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afterlife can neither be accepted or rejected on intellectual. In the 
language suggested by William James, the existence of afterlife is a 
“live” hypothesis: that is, there exists some probability that it is 
true.27 Ghazzali seeks to establish the validity of the pragmatic ar-
gument – as applied to the question of afterlife – with several hy-
pothetical examples relating to choices that have more immediate 
consequences. “Suppose you are about to eat food and someone 
tells you a serpent has spat venom on it, you would probably re-
frain and rather endure the pangs of hunger than eat it, though 
your informant may be in jest or lying.” This is because he is 
aware that he could die from eating the food if it were truly poi-
soned: again, using William James‟ language, the consequences of 
choice are “momentous.” Applied to the question of afterlife, 
Ghazzali concludes, even if one “is doubtful about a future exis-
tence, reason suggests that he should act as if there were one, con-
sidering the tremendous issues at stake.”28 
 
♦ 
 
Is there something in the nature of religions, especially the Abra-
hamic religions, that sets the stage for the Pascalian wager? 
In order to gain persuasive force, Pascal‟s wager must satisfy 
four conditions articulated by William James for the wager to have 
some force.29 The wager gains in efficacy when a person faces an 
„option‟ – choice between two and only two hypotheses that can-
not be decided on intellectual grounds alone. In addition, the op-
tion must be „live,‟ „forced,‟ and produce momentous consequences. 
An option is „live‟ when each of the hypotheses contained in it 
carry some chance of being true. It is „forced‟ when the two 
choices do not overlap and there is no possibility of not making a 
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choice. Finally, an option is „momentous‟ when it is unique or 
non-repeatable, it is irreversible or cannot be undone, and the 
choices have important consequences. It may be noted that the 
live-ness of a hypothesis may depend on subjective factors – a 
person‟s emotional disposition – or it may be enhanced by reason-
ing and evidence, even if they are faulty in themselves. An option 
that satisfies all these conditions is „genuine.‟  
It follows that a person facing a „genuine option‟ will make a 
choice on pragmatic grounds, that is, by comparing the gains and 
losses associated with belief and unbelief. He will make the choice 
that yields him greater happiness. If he knows the probability that 
he attaches to the truth of the choices in the option, he will make 
the choice that yields the greatest expected happiness.  
Once we grasp the elements of a „genuine option,‟ it is easy to 
see that Christianity and Islam – implicitly if not explicitly – offer 
the Pascalian wager for our consideration. These religions offer an 
„option‟ before us, a choice between accepting or rejecting its par-
ticular system of metaphysical claims whose truth, moreover, can-
not be determined on the basis of reasoning and ordinary expe-
rience. The beliefs of these religions carry some degree of plausibility 
– they have live-ness – for some people, especially those who have 
been brought up in that religious tradition. The option offered by 
these religions – to believe or not to believe – is a „forced‟ one. In 
these religions, the agnostic „I don‟t know‟ is subsumed under dis-
belief, since the rewards only flow from belief. Moreover, since 
earthly life is a one-shot affair in Christianity and Islam and the 
verdicts passed on the Day of Judgment are irrevocable, the choice 
between belief and disbelief has momentous consequences.  
The Pascalian wager may lose some of its force when offered 
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to adherents of the Indic religions – Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Jainism. A belief in the transmigration of souls makes the „option‟ 
presented by the Pascalian wager less the than momentous, since a 
wrong decision made in one life may be corrected in a subsequent 
incarnation. On the contrary, rebirth into a lower life-form – such 
as a slimy worm – may be sufficiently repellant to induce a choice 
in favor of Indic religious beliefs.  
Similarly, the Pascalian wager could not have carried much trac-
tion in early Judaism which gave little importance to afterlife.30 In 
Judaism before the exile, afterlife consisted of a shadowy existence 
to which all spirits were admitted after death. Written after the ex-
ile, the Hebrew Bible was opposed to preexilic beliefs about after-
life; at the same time, it refused to imbue afterlife with ethical sig-
nificance. An elaborate system of beliefs about afterlife entered in-
to Judaism during the Hellenic period. Indeed, references to after-
life in the Hebrew Bible are rare.31 Jesus too has little to say about 
afterlife. Beliefs about afterlife and resurrection enter into Chris-
tianity through the writings of Paul, but following him it becomes 
central to the later Christian doctrine of salvation.32  
Only the Qur‟an makes belief in afterlife – together with the 
doctrines of Heaven, Hell and the Day of Judgment – an indis-
pensable article of faith. Life on earth is a trial, a short respite be-
tween birth and death during which man is tested, and following a 
careful vetting of his earthly life on the Day of Judgment, he will 
enjoy unending felicity or suffer an eternity of Hell fire. The after-
life and themes connected to it are present in nearly every chapter 
of the Qur‟an; and many of the early chapters contain graphic im-
ages of the conditions men and women will encounter on the Day 
of Judgment. The Qur‟anic message of life as a test whose results 
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will determine the condition of the soul in afterlife holds deep sway 
over the consciousness of devout Muslims. As a result, a pious Mus-
lim spends his earthly life as a preparation for afterlife. 
In view of the Qur‟an‟s insistent preoccupation with the hereaf-
ter and individual accountability in this life and the next, it is not 
surprising that it – alone among the scriptures – should use this 
framework to propose the wager as an argument for submitting to 
God. On the other hand, since the Hebrew Bible does not attach 
any ethical significance to afterlife, it could not have proposed the 
wager even if it wanted to. Although Jesus had little to say about 
afterlife, the elaboration of a doctrine of afterlife by the early 
Church fathers created the preconditions for making pragmatic 
arguments for belief to pagan skeptics. John Ryan has docu-
mented two instances of such arguments in the writings of Chris-
tian theologians from the early centuries of the Christian era.33  
It is worth pointing out that the pragmatic arguments we en-
counter in the Qur‟an, „Ali, Ghazzali and Pascal are implicit in the 
very notion of an afterlife, in which men and women face the con-
sequences of the way they live their earthly life. In other words, al-
though most people born into the Islamic or Christian tradition 
may not be able to spell out the pragmatic argument for faith in a 
manner that would satisfy philosophers or game theorists, this 
does not mean that they cannot work out – if intuitively – the 
gains and losses in afterlife from belief and unbelief in this life. 
Men and women troubled with doubts about their faith are more 
likely to make such comparisons the more insistently their scrip-
ture speaks of an afterlife, and the more pervasive themes about 
afterlife are in the sermons and discourse of the religious classes. 
We may expect the doctrine of divine intervention in this life to 
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work in the same way, as a pragmatic argument for inducing faith 
in skeptics.  
 
♦ 
 
Pascal‟s wager attacks both atheism and agnosticism as irrational 
on pragmatic grounds. This has drawn the ire of philosophers 
who do not take kindly to faith. They claim to show that the dif-
ferent versions of the wager are logically flawed. Alternatively, 
even if some version of the wager is logically valid, they maintain 
that beliefs should not be founded on pragmatic considerations.34 
These criticisms are beside the point from vantage point of 
God who has an overriding interest in saving souls. For Him, the 
question of interest is not whether the wager is logically water-
tight, but whether it succeeds in bringing people to belief in God. 
If this efficacy is the relevant criterion for judging the wager, the 
point is to examine the conditions that augment its efficacy. 
Consider the version of the wager that hinges on a comparison 
of the expected values of the two choices – believing or not be-
lieving. On the one hand, these expected values will depend on 
the subjective probabilities that a person attaches to the truth of 
the theist and atheist positions. These expected values will also 
depend on the vividness and immediacy with which anyone views 
the joys of Heaven and the torments of Hell. A little reflection will 
suggest some strong parallels between the pragmatic arguments 
for belief and the arguments for not giving up (or not taking up) 
smoking. All this suggests that there are multiple and complex fac-
tors that will determine for any individual the expected value he 
places on the theist and non-theist positions.  
At the same time, someone familiar with the Qur‟an can see 
17 
 
some of the ways in which it is likely to add to the efficacy of the 
pragmatic arguments. Unlike other scriptures that take belief and be-
lievers for granted – or merely denounces or threatens disbelievers 
with punishment – the Qur‟an brings disbelievers and skeptics into 
its discourse, allows them to articulate their objections, and then 
strives mightily to overcome their objections.35 We shall show them our 
signs – God promises in surah Fussilat – on the far horizons and in them-
selves, until it become clear to them that this is the Truth. 36 The Qur‟an offers 
arguments to establish its divine origin: it challenges the Arabs to pro-
duce a sura like it, and call on anyone you can beside God if they are telling 
the truth; it argues them that if it had been from anyone other than God, 
they would have found much inconsistency in it. It argues vigorously for a 
single Creator-God, thus reducing the appeal of the many-gods ob-
jection to Pascal‟s wager. It repeatedly makes the case for afterlife: it 
invokes the analogy of the dead earth coming back to life; it reminds 
man that if God could create life in the first instance, he can also 
recreate it; and it appeals to the innate human thirst for a transcen-
dent purpose to life and creation. The cumulative effect of these ar-
guments – aimed at different levels of human understanding – is to 
increase the plausibility of its metaphysical claims. 
In addition, the Qur‟an constantly nudges man to wager on be-
lief by a variety of means.37 It reminds him repeatedly of the tor-
ments of Hell, the self-renewing pain which its inhabitants will 
endure, and the endless entreaties of the inhabitants of Hell to 
God to give them another chance. In surah Al-Waqi’a, the Qur‟an 
speaks thus of those on the Left [the inhabitants of Hell]:/ They will 
dwell amid scorching wind and scalding water/ in the shadow of black 
smoke,/ neither cool nor refreshing./…and you who have gone astray and de-
nied the truth/will eat from the bitter Zaqqum,/ filling your bellies with it,/ 
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and drink scalding water,/ lapping it like thirsty camels.‟ Likewise, the 
Qur‟an endlessly marshals images of felicity to give a foretaste of 
the joys that await the believers who will earn a place in Heaven. 
In the same surah, God speaks thus of the „pleasures‟ that will be-
long to the ones brought nearest to God/in Gardens of Bliss/: On couches of 
well-woven cloth/they will sit facing each other;/ everlasting youths will go 
round among them/with glasses, flagons, and a pure liquid/ that causes no 
headache or intoxication;/ [there will be] any fruit they want;/ the meat of 
any bird they like;/ and beautiful companions/ like hidden pearls;/ a reward 
for what used to do./ They will hear no idle or sinful talk there/ only clean 
and wholesome speech. These are but samples of the diverse images 
that the Qur‟an uses to illustrate (in terms of sensory experience) 
the nature of the pain and pleasures of afterlife. 
In addition, the Qur‟an makes a strong linkage between our be-
liefs, choices and actions in this life and the chances of going to 
Hell or Heaven. God keeps a meticulous account of what we do 
in this life, and on the Day of Judgment He will decide on our fate 
in afterlife based on a weighing of these accounts. So that men 
and women will not pin their hopes on being forgiven in afterlife, 
the Qur‟an emphasizes that death is final, that we are given only 
one life on earth, and the time for seeking forgiveness is before 
death. There is no escape from Hell and no expulsion from Hea-
ven: both are eternal. Acting against the human propensity to put 
off difficult decisions to a later date, the Qur‟an reminds man that 
the time and place of his death have been fixed but unknown to 
him; death may overtake him at any instant leaving him no time to 
repent. The Qur‟an repeatedly compares the brevity of earthly life 
to a hereafter that is everlasting. In short, by speaking repeatedly 
of human mortality, afterlife, Day of Judgment, Hell and Heaven, 
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the Qur‟an is likely to nudge its readers to place their bets on be-
lief.  
 
♦ 
 
Unusually for a scripture, the Qur‟an does not take the man of 
faith for granted, nor does it speak exclusively to him. On the 
contrary, it speaks to man as he is: God created man in the finest state 
but brought him down to the lowest of the low. Man is ruh (spirit) coupled 
to a nafs (ego), dominated by appetites, passions, and ambitions 
that act to anchor him to this world, obscuring the urge to return 
to his spiritual home. In addition, man is endowed with reasoning, 
a mode of knowing that allows him to navigate the world of sen-
sory experiences. When man becomes deeply attached to the life 
of the nafs, his sensory experiences atrophy, they become self-
contained instead of serving as pointers to a higher reality. At the 
same time, his rational faculty becomes hegemonic: it rejects all 
other forms of knowing. In other words, it is content to work only 
with the data of his atrophied sensory experience and, therefore, be-
comes skeptical of the knowledge gained through other modes of 
knowing. Unremittingly, the Qur‟an seeks to draw this skeptical 
man back towards God by facilitating his return to higher modes 
of knowing. In seeking to save man, the Qur‟an employs all the 
rhetorical arts of persuasion, even using reason to establish its lim-
its, and, hence, opening him to higher modes of knowing. Given 
the Qur‟an‟s comprehensive program of salvation, it would be 
surprising if it did not employ pragmatic arguments to make the 
case for faith on rational and utilitarian grounds.  
Those who wish to take a sociological approach to the Qur‟an‟s 
use of pragmatic arguments may choose to explain the pragmatic 
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arguments as a response to the intellectual character of Mecca 
where the Qur‟an was first revealed and where Prophet Muham-
mad (s) spent the first thirteen years of his career as a prophet.38 
Contrary to the prejudices of many Western writers, the Prophet 
was not born among „savage‟ Bedouins who lived off their camels 
and engaged endlessly in skirmishing with each other. On the con-
trary, he was born to the ancient and noble clan of Quraish, who 
were ancient guardians of the Kaaba – the central shrine of Arabia 
– as well as its leading traders. Nevertheless, it is true that the city-
dwelling traders of Makka as well as the Bedouins living in much 
of the Arabia peninsula were pagans – almost the only people in 
the ancient Near East who had not entered into the rites of a re-
vealed religion – who worshipped a multiplicity of gods and did 
not believe in an afterlife. As the livelihood of most Meccans de-
pended on trading that took them on journeys south to Yemen 
and Ethiopia and North and West to Syria and Iraq, their exten-
sive travels, their familiarity with diverse cultures, and their expe-
rience with trade in different commodities, business partnerships, 
lending and borrowing, and currency exchanges must have given a 
strongly rationalist character to their thinking. As Prophet Mu-
hammad (s) spoke to this sophisticated audience, rationalist, em-
pirical, disbelieving of revelations, miracles and afterlife, he had to 
address their skepticism and earth-rooted vision of life with every 
rhetorical and rational means that had a chance of denting their 
skepticism. In support of this interpretation, the sociologist may 
draw attention to the fact that in all but one instance, the pragmat-
ic case for belief is made in the Meccan chapters.39  
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